The impact of taxes on income mobility by Alloza, Mario
The Impact of Taxes on Income Mobility
Mario Allozay
BANK OF SPAIN and CENTRE FOR MACROECONOMICS
October 4, 2016
Abstract
This paper investigates how taxes aect relative mobility in the income distri-
bution in the US. Household panel data drawn from the PSID between 1967 and
1996 is employed to analyse the relationship between marginal tax rates and the
probability of staying in the same income decile. Exogenous variation in marginal
tax rates is identied by using counterfactual rates based on legislated changes
in the tax schedule. I nd that higher marginal tax rates reduce income mobility.
An increase in one percentage point in marginal tax rates causes a decline of
around 0.8% in the probability of changing to a dierent income decile. Tax re-
forms that reduce marginal rates by 7 percentage points are estimated to account
for around a tenth of the average movements in the income distribution in a year.
Additional results suggest that the eect of taxes on income mobility diers ac-
cording to the level of human capital and that it is particularly signicant when
considering mobility at the bottom of the distribution.
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1 Introduction
The last four decades have witnessed a sustained increase in income and wealth inequal-
ity in the US, particularly at the top end of the distribution.1 This phenomenon has
received substantial attention in academic research,2 policy debates as mentioned in
President Obama's Economic Report (see Council of Economic Advisers (2015)), and
popular opinion (e.g. protest movements such as Occupy Wall Street). As noted in Ar-
row and Intriligator (2015), inequality is a highly relevant normative issue, since society
perceives an unequal distribution of income as an unjust outcome of market economies.
However, there are other features of the income distribution beyond inequality that
have welfare implications for the society and are relevant from a policy point of view.
Overlooking some of these aspects may yield an incomplete or inaccurate picture of the
eects of policies that address economic disparities.
This paper looks at the impact of scal policy on another aspect of the income
distribution dierent to inequality. Particularly, I investigate the relationship between
taxes and income mobility. While inequality reects changes in the variance (and
higher moments) of the income distribution, income mobility is the result of variations
in the covariance of income between two periods of time.3 For any given level of
income inequality, mobility reduces the association between the positions of origin and
destination in the income distribution, increasing equality of opportunity. Therefore, to
the extent that income mobility is a desirable feature of an economy, it is then relevant
to consider how scal policy may aect it.4
I analyse the impact of taxes on the probability of moving in the income distribu-
tion in the US using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). I measure
income mobility as changes in the relative position of households in the income dis-
tribution (i.e. changes in deciles or quintiles) across time. Income is dened as the
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) of the household. I assess the degree of mobility across
three specications for the income distribution that consider pre-tax income, post-tax
income and post-tax and post-transfer income respectively. Then, I construct the fed-
1See Piketty and Saez (2003) for long-run trends in income inequality and Saez and Zucman (2014)
or Quadrini and Ros-Rull (2015) for the case of wealth.
2Piketty (2014) provides extensive evidence of income and wealth inequality around the world while
Stiglitz (2012) highlights its consequences: \the impact of inequality on societies is now increasingly
well understood -higher crime, health problems, and mental illness, lower educational achievements,
social cohesion and life expectancy" (inside cover).
3See Gottschalk (1997).
4Kopczuk et al. (2010) argue for the need to study income inequality and mobility jointly. Income
mobility is a determinant of inequality in the long run: when there is no mobility in the income
distribution, short-run inequality perpetuates.
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eral individual tax liabilities faced by each household in the sample using the NBER
TAXSIM simulator. With these data in hand, I estimate a linear probability model to
understand how changes in the marginal tax rate aect the likelihood that households
are mobile in the income distribution during two adjacent years. My identication ap-
proach accounts for endogeneity in the marginal rates by isolating the variation in taxes
that is only due to legislative changes. I exploit this source of exogenous variation as
an instrument in the regressions.
The results obtained suggest that higher marginal tax rates reduce income mobility.
Particularly, I nd that an increase of one percentage point in the marginal rate is
associated with declines of about 0.5-1.3% in the probability of changing deciles of
income. A decrease of 7 percentage points in the marginal tax rate (slightly smaller
than a standard deviation of non-zero changes in the rates) can account for about a
tenth of the average income mobility in a year. The eect of taxes on mobility arises
in specications that consider income distributions both before and after taxes and
transfers, suggesting that the impact of taxation on mobility goes beyond redistribution
eects. The economic mechanism that induces this impact seems to be related to the
labour market incentives created by changes in the tax schedule. Additional results
suggest that the eect of taxation on income mobility diers according to the level of
human capital (measured as the education of the head of the household) and that it is
particularly signicant when considering mobility at the bottom of the distribution.
The evidence that taxes have a negative impact on income mobility has important
implications for the design of policies that aim to address economic disparities. While
some studies have pointed out to the importance of progressive taxation in addressing
inequality,5 the results from this paper suggest that such changes may have a detrimen-
tal impact on income mobility. Therefore, the design of optimal scal policy should
consider the overall impact on welfare of the trade-o that might arise when jointly
addressing income inequality and mobility.
This paper relates to dierent strands of literature. First, it is connected to the
literature that investigates the eects of tax changes on taxable income (elasticity of
taxable income, or ETI), as reviewed in Saez et al. (2012). This research nds that
taxable income only reacts moderately to changes in the marginal tax rate.6 Mertens
(2013) suggests that accounting for empirical diculties in the estimation of the ETI at
5See Piketty and Saez (2007) and Diamond and Saez (2011).
6Saez et al. (2012) suggest a range of estimates from 0.12 to 0.40 for the ETI. The authors argue
that responses for the top-earners can be substantially higher. For example, Slemrod (1996) nds that
the Tax Revenue Act of 1986 explains to a large extent the increase in reported income of the top
earners.
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the aggregate level (such as policy endogeneity or timing) results in larger elasticities
for dierent income groups beyond the top earners. My paper relates to some method-
ological aspects of this literature,7 but I focus on the eects of taxes on measures of
household's mobility across the income distribution as opposed to the individual's re-
sponse of reported taxable income (for this purpose I employ a dierent type of data,
the PSID, that allows me to control for relevant demographic factors).
My paper relates to an extensive literature on income mobility surveyed in Fields and
Ok (1999) and Jantti and Jenkins (2015).8 Early works on the measurement of income
mobility include Shorrocks (1978a) and Shorrocks (1978b), which lay down many of
the tools currently used to measure mobility. A number of papers have investigated
the degree and evolution of mobility in terms of income (broadly dened) and earnings.
Hungerford (1993) uses family income data from the PSID to analyse trends in mobility,
focusing on changes in the position in the income distribution between 7 year-periods in
both annual and permanent income. The author compares mobility between the 1970s
and 1980s to nd considerable movement within the income distribution (although he
nds less evidence of sizeable upward or downward movements). Also using PSID data,
Gottschalk (1997) looks at earnings mobility in one-year and seventeen-year periods.
The author concludes that the degree of mobility is high enough to support the view
that people are not stuck at the bottom or at the top of the distribution. Kopczuk et al.
(2010) employs individual data from the Social Security Administration to investigate
the evolution of both short-term mobility (measured by changes in rank correlation in
year-to-year earnings and in mobility indices dened over periods of 3-5 years) and long-
term mobility (i.e. across the working life). More recently, Bradbury (2011) looks at
various indices of income mobility using the PSID between 1969-2006 and time intervals
spanning 11 years.
Although the concepts of mobility and samples used dier, these papers nd a
similar evolution of mobility in the US: a relatively at prole during the 1970s and a
somewhat decreasing trend after that. I measure mobility in comparable ways to this
literature, however, since my main goal is to identify the eects of tax changes, I instead
7I use variation in legislated taxes to address endogeneity following Gruber and Saez (2002).
8During this paper, I will refer to income mobility as intragenerational mobility. Jantti and Jenkins
(2015) also survey the literature on intergenerational or social mobility (the degree of association
between parents and children income). There has been a recent increase in the research aiming to
understand the degree of intergenerational mobility and its factors. For example, Chetty et al. (2014a)
analyses the geographical dierences of intergenerational mobility in the US and Chetty et al. (2014b)
explores its evolution over time, which has remained fairly constant despite rising inequality. The
determinants of social mobility are explored in Chetty and Hendren (2015), who investigate how
neighbourhoods aect intergenerational mobility through childhood exposure eects.
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consider mobility across two adjacent years.9
The literature on the eect of taxes on income mobility is more limited. Lerman and
Yitzhaki (1995) analyse the eects of the 1991 tax reform on the income distribution
recognising two potential channels: higher taxes can reduce the income gaps between
people and, in some cases, change their relative position by means of redistribution.
The authors decompose the evolution of the Gini coecient due to income changes
holding the relative position constant and due to changes in the relative position holding
income constant, and nd that this second eect is important in understanding the
redistribution eects of the the 1991 tax reform. Larrimore et al. (2015) analyse the
determinants of income mobility between two-year periods using a panel of tax returns
between 1999 and 2011. They compute the dierence between income before and after
federal taxes as a measure of the stabilising power of taxes.
In contrast to both Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) and Larrimore et al. (2015), I
analyse the eects of taxes on mobility that can also be due to changes on the pre-tax
income (i.e. because of a change in the labour supply), not only due to the redistribution
eect of the tax system. More substantially, my paper uses a dierent methodology
to asses the impact of taxes on income mobility by exploiting exogenous variation in
the marginal tax rates, over a relatively long panel of data that includes several tax
reforms.
This paper also relates to the literature that investigates the aggregate impact of
taxes such as Romer and Romer (2010) and Barro and Redlick (2011). Both studies nd
substantial eects of changes in taxes on economic activity. Romer and Romer (2010)
estimate the impact of a tax increase of 1 percent of GDP to amount to a reduction
of output by 3% over the course of three years. Barro and Redlick (2011) nd that
the eect of taxes on GDP act mainly through substitution eects, with increases in
the average marginal tax rates signicantly reducing GDP.10 Mertens and Ravn (2013)
highlight the importance of distinguishing between dierent type of taxes, estimating
large eects of taxes on output in the short run. Zidar (2015) exploits variation in US
states to nd aggregate eects on employment resulting from tax cuts for lower-income
groups (as opposed to tax cuts for the top 10% of the income distributions, which are
not found to have a large eect on employment growth).
Income and wealth inequality have been the object of extensive study in macroeco-
9Gottschalk (1997) notes that accounting for longer periods is not necessarily more appropriate
than one-year periods to analyse mobility and inequality, given the fact that low-income households
are more likely to face borrowing constraints over longer horizons.
10Barro and Redlick (2011) nd that GDP falls 1.1 for each dollar increase in federal taxes, with
one year lag.
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nomics.11 Piketty and Saez (2003) use a long panel of tax returns to analyse income
inequality trends in the US since 1917. The authors nd that income inequality, as
measured by the share of income by the top decile earners, sharply decreased during
World War II and started to increase from the 1970s.12 Piketty (2014) compiles exten-
sive empirical evidence on the evolution of income and wealth inequality for the US and
other countries, nding a noticeable increase in both variables. The author suggests
that this increase in inequality is a feature of capitalist economies (given that the rate
of return of capital is found to exceed that of economic growth) and advocates for scal
reforms that establish a global wealth tax and a more progressive income taxation.
In order to understand the causes of wealth inequality, macroeconomic models have
relaxed the assumption of a representative agent, allowing for heterogeneity in earnings
and other characteristics, in the spirit of Aiyagari (1994).13 Quadrini and Ros-Rull
(2015) survey the literature on the theories used the explain the causes of inequality, and
its implications for the aggregate economy. While economic models predict that wealthy
households tend to dissave, this is at odds with the data. De Nardi (2015) surveys the
mechanisms that have been used to explain the reasons for wealthy individuals to
exhibit a high rate of savings and its implications for wealth inequality. This literature
has found that dierences in the degree of patience among individuals, the transmission
of human capital (skills passed from parents to children) and voluntary bequests across
generations or the decisions to become an entrepreneur are plausible reasons that can
explain some aspects of the distribution of wealth.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops a simple frame-
work to understand the relevant mechanisms behind the eect of taxation and income
mobility. Section 3 describes how the data regarding income mobility and taxes are
constructed. The empirical strategy and the main results are described in Section 4.
Section 5 contains several robustness checks. Further empirical results on the hetero-
geneous eects of taxes on income mobility are explored in Section 6. Lastly, Section 7
concludes and discusses potential extensions.
11Aghion et al. (2015) investigate the relationship between innovativeness and both top-income
inequality and social mobility.
12Building on the same dataset, Saez and Zucman (2014) capitalise income to produce a measure of
wealth inequality, and nd that this variable has substantially increased in the last few years.
13See Heathcote et al. (2009).
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2 A Simple Theoretical Framework
Before turning to the empirical analysis, I consider a simple model of labour supply
to highlight the key determinants of the relationship between taxation and income
mobility.
Consider an economy populated by two households (i = 1; 2) with quasilinear pref-
erences:
U(ci;t; ni;t) = ici;t   Xi
1 + 1
i
n
1+ 1
i
t
where ci;t and ni;t represent consumption and hours worked for household i at date
t. Preference parameters can potentially depend on each household characteristics: i
represents the relative weight of consumption in the utility function, Xi denotes pref-
erences regarding labour supply (which could be determined by demographic variables,
family composition, etc.) and i  0 is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply (a key
element in this framework).
Individuals face a budget constraint ci;t = (wi;tni;t)   T (wi;tni;t), where wages wi;t
evolve exogenously following wi;t = w(1  "i;t), with "i > 0. In each period, wages are
equal to w1;t = w(1 + "1;t) for household i = 1 and w2;t = w(1   "2;t) for household 2
with probability  > 0. With probability 1    wages become w1;t = w(1   "1;t) and
w2;t = w(1 + "2;t). The tax system is assumed to be given as:
T 0(wi;tni;t) =
(
L +  if (wi;tni;t)  (1 + ")wnHi;t
L if (wi;tni;t) < (1 + ")wn
H
i;t
(1)
where L and L+  are the marginal tax rates faced by households with a low or high
wage realisation, respectively. nH

i;t and n
L
i;t are the labour supply functions that result
from optimality in consumption-leisure decisions:
nH

i;t =

(1  L   )(1 + ")w i
Xi
i
nL

i;t =

(1  L)(1  ")w i
Xi
i
Assuming that preferences are the same for both type of households (1 = 2 = ,
1 = 2 = , X1 = X2 = X), when  = 0 the tax schedule becomes proportional
and the household with a higher realisation of wages (say, i = 1) is ranked rst in the
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income distribution:
(1  L)(1 + ")wnH1;t > (1  L)(1  ")wnL

2;t
Conditional on an initial distribution of income, the relative income mobility in this
economy is given by Pr (movejw2;t 1 = w(1 + ")) = .
When  is positive, the tax schedule is progressive and both labour-supply functions
are related by:
nH

i;t =

1  
1  L

1 + "
1  "

nL

i;t
In any given period, the optimal labour supply choice weights two opposing eects:
(i) a higher wage 1+"
1 " increases the price of leisure and makes the household willing
to supply more labour and (ii) a higher rate  makes the tax system more progressive
and reduces the incentives to supply more hours of work. As long as  < (1   Lt ) 2"1+"
the household will have incentives to take advantage of a higher wage draw and will
optimally choose to supply more labour nH

i;t > n
L
i;t . When  is high enough, the tax
schedule eliminates the incentives to work induced by a a high-wage shock. Particularly,
when  = (1   Lt ) 2"1+" the household will decide to not to increase the hours of work
due to the wage shock and nH

i;t = n
L
i;t .
14
In the case of  = (1   Lt ) 2"1+" , both households supply the same amount of hours
worked. In the presence of preference shocks Xi that counteract the eects of the wage
shocks, less progressive taxation would render the labour supply of the households more
sensitive to changes in wages, resulting in higher income mobility.
This simple framework allows us to derive the following implications. First and
most important, the tax system can reduce income mobility by disincentivizing labour
supply. This eect arises because households take less advantage of economic oppor-
tunities when the marginal tax rate is very high. The nal eect on mobility depends
crucially on the Frisch elasticity of labour supply (and whether it is homogeneous across
households) since this parameter governs how much the taxes distort the incentives to
work. Preferences regarding consumption also matter. A wealth eect on labour sup-
ply, which is absent in this minimal framework, will make households more willing to
supply work when taxes increase (although this eect will be mitigated by a progressive
tax schedule). Another important factor in determining mobility is the wealth accu-
mulation. When savings are allowed, households face an intertemporal optimisation
14When we consider L = 0:25 (approximately the US average federal marginal tax rate on individual
income during 1967-1996), w = 10 and productivity shocks representing 5% of the base wage w, then
we have that the value of  such that nH

i;t = n
L
i;t is  = 0:07, resulting in 
L +  = 0:32.
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problem. Those households who are lucky and obtain subsequent realisations of high
wages will be able to build up savings. The return obtained from these savings will
increase total income, making it less likely to move down in the income distribution.
Therefore, while taxes are likely to have an eect on income mobility, the precise
impact remains an empirical question. When estimating this eect, it will be important
to use data that allows separating household eects (as, for example, taste for leisure)
from household shocks. The PSID, given its panel nature, is an attractive dataset to
address this question.
3 Data and Trends
The PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) is an annual survey elaborated by the
University of Michigan since 1968.15 It follows the same families and their split-os
over time, creating a panel structure. The survey was originally created from two
samples: the Survey Research Center (SRC) or core sample (representative at the
national level), and the Survey of Economic opportunity (SEO) or Census sample,
which over-represents low income households. The PSID provides weights that render
the combination of both samples representative of the US population while accounting
for the attrition that occurs over time when families are stopped being interviewed.
I restrict the whole sample by considering main adults (the heads and their spouses)
of households that are led by a male working head aged 25 to 60 who is not self-
employed. Following Aaronson and French (2009), families with a head working less
than 300 or more than 4,500 hours per year, earning less than $3 or more than $200
per hours in 1996 prices are considered outliers and dropped from the sample. This
selection criteria is based on the intention to reect changes in the income mobility that
arise as a result of labour market interaction. In Section 5, I check the robustness of
the results when considering a more inclusive sample. This selection leads to a total
of 5,430 (continuously married) households representing a total of 50,471 observations
between 1967 and 1996. The nal date of the sample is dictated by the change in the
PSID frequency produced in 1997 (referring to data from 1996), when the periodicity
of data releases switched from annual to biannual.
15The survey contains data from 1967, since some of the variables asked (e.g. income) refer to the
previous year.
9
3.1 Measuring income mobility
This section discusses issues related to income mobility measure and explores its dy-
namics in the US over the sample period.
Consider an ordering of income in time t in N dierent ranks (i.e. quantiles of
income). Let snt denote the households with income belonging to rank n 2 [1; N ]. The
mobility process can be represented by a vector st = (s
1
t ; s
2
t ; : : : ; s
N
t ) and a probability
matrix P with dimension n n and rows adding up to 1 such that:
st = Ptst 1 (2)
The vector st 1 summarises the probability distribution of income in period t   1.
The matrix P characterises the mobility process by determining the probability that
a household in income group n at time t   1 remains in the same decile next period
(entry P n;n in matrix P) or transits to another decile k 6= n.16
There are dierent indices that can be used to measure the degree of income mobil-
ity.17 The immobility ratio (IR) summarises changes in relative positions by computing
the degree of concentration along the diagonal of matrix P , i.e. the fraction of house-
holds that remain in the same income group during two periods of time. In the case of
extreme immobility (no household changes deciles between t and t  1), IR= 1.
In a similar vein, the normalised trace index (NTI) proposed by Shorrocks (1978b)
uses the elements in the diagonal of P to measure mobility:
NTI =
N   trace(P )
N   1
When P is the identity matrix, the sum of the diagonal of matrix P is equal to N and
the NTI becomes 0.
Both the IR and NTI indices use information from the diagonal of matrix P . The
Average Jump Index (Bartholomew (1973)) exploits other information in P to asses the
degree of mobility by counting the number of income thresholds (e.g. deciles) that a
households passes through between two periods. This index is computed as the average
of absolute changes in income ranks for all the sample. A value of 0 indicates perfect
immobility (origin independence).
16In the special case when vector st 1 contains all the necessary information to predict st, i.e.
Prob(stjst 1; st 2;; : : : ; st k) = Prob(stjst 1) 8k  1 and t, the process st is said to be Markovian. P
becomes the Markov matrix and transitions along the income distribution between k periods can be
obtained from st+k = stP
k.
17See Fields and Ok (1999) or Jantti and Jenkins (2015) for exhaustive reviews of the dierent tools
available to measure income mobility.
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There are other measures that are not restricted to the relative position of house-
holds in the income distribution. This is the case of the Pearson correlation (r), dened
as:
r = corr
 
log(inct 1); log(inct)

where inct is the real level of income at time t. The Hart index (Hart (1976)) is a
variant of this measure and is dened by H = 1 r. When income between two periods
is perfectly correlated, we have the case of complete immobility and H = 0.
Income is constructed as the Adjusted Aggregate Income (AGI) based on the joint
taxable income of the head and spouse in the household.18 Dierent measures of income
(before taxes, after taxes, and after transfers) are used to assess mobility.
Figure 1 plots the evolution of the mobility indices described above using a pre-
tax measure of income, setting N = 10 (income is divided in deciles) and allowing t
to represent a year. While many studies in the literature focus on a longer horizon to
analyse mobility (e.g. ve years), I choose to use a shorter horizon to be able to identify
the eect of taxation on income mobility.
The degree of co-movement between the indices of mobility is high: 1-IR and NTI
have a correlation of 95%. The correlation between those two indices and the measure
of income ranks passed is of 90 and 88%, respectively. The correlation between the
Hart index and the rest of mobility measures ranges between 70 and above 80%.
The evolution of these indices shows a at prole from the end of the 1960s to the
end of the 1970s, although the NTI index exhibits a slightly upward trend during this
period. Mobility declines somewhat during the decade of the 80s. It increases more
noticeably at the beginning of 1990s (particularly the 1-IR index), but then returns to
previous levels towards the end of the sample. The comparison of this evidence with
that found in the literature is dicult, since many studies focus on income mobility
during a longer time horizon (see for example Hungerford (1993) and those cited in
Jantti and Jenkins (2015)). However, Gittleman and Joyce (1999) considers similar
mobility indices for 1, 5 and 10-year windows between 1969 and 1990. The authors
nd a mild reduction in mobility during the 1970s and an upwards trends until 1990.
Gottschalk (1997) reports a transition matrix across quintiles of income between 1973
and 1974 using PSID which is largely similar to my estimation of matrix P in Equation 2
for those years (not shown).
While Figure 1 displays the probability of mobility overall, it is also interesting to
18A broader denition of income would include other sources within the family (e.g. children or
other relatives). However this would require making assumptions on how to identify tax units within
the household and limit the availability of data. Section 5 explores the robustness of the results to
dierent denition of income.
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analyse whether these trends in mobility are shared across particular income ranks.
Figure A1 shows the evolution of 1 P 1;1 and 1 PN;N (where P k;k is the k; k element
of matrix P in Equation 2) for pre-tax and post-tax distributions of income. The
probability that a household moves away from the rst decile of income (Panel A) has
recorded an upward trend during most of the time horizon, only to be reverted towards
the end of the sample period. The evolution of the probability of not remaining in the
top decile shows a pattern that resembles that of the 1-IR index commented in the
previous paragraph: a downwards trend initiated after 1975 which changes direction
since the beginning of the 1990s.
3.2 Taxation in the US during the sample period
I use the NBER's TAXSIM program to construct the federal tax liabilities faced for
each household in the sample. This tax simulator recreates each year's tax law by
taking into account features of the US tax code such as the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) or deductions and exemption phase-
outs. Since TAXSIM only computes state taxes since 1977 and due to the regressive
nature of Social Security taxes (FICA), the main empirical results in Section 4 make
use of a longer horizon (and additional tax reforms) by exclusively considering changes
in federal taxation. The eects of including state and social security taxes are explained
in Section 5.
TAXSIM computes the eective marginal tax rates by increasing taxable income
by 1$.19 For many households in the PSID sample these tax rates are determined by
the statutory tax rates associated with each income bracket. However, the eective
marginal tax rate of other households will also be determined by the phase-out and
other features of the tax code.
Marginal tax rates from TAXSIM are calculated based on tax year, marital status
(since the sample only considers (legally) married people, I assume them to le taxes
jointly), number of dependants (including those under 17 years), labour income from
the head of the household and his spouse, asset income (arising from rentals, dividends
or interests), taxable pensions, Social Security Income, property taxes and deductions
on mortgage interests.20
Federal marginal tax rates have experienced substantial variation during the period
considered (1967-1996). Figure 2 (Panel A) shows the evolution of the average marginal
19See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for an introduction to the TAXSIM program.
20Since mortgage interests are not available in the PSID for all the time horizon, I follow Aaronson
and French (2009) and assume that 80% of mortgage payments go to interest to impute this variable.
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tax rate for each income decile in US during 1967-1996.21 The broken line shows the
average marginal tax rate for federal individual income taxes from Barro and Redlick
(2011).22 Marginal tax rates show a marked increase during the 1970s, mainly as the
result of high ination that pushed households' income to higher tax brackets because
of imperfect indexation of the tax schedule. This upward trend was more substantial for
higher incomes: the average marginal tax rate for those in the top decile increased 22
percentage points between 1967 and 1980 (from 26.9% up to 49%) while the increase for
the bottom three deciles ranged between 5 and 7 percentage points. This upward trend
was substantially reverted during the decade of 1980s. This was the result of major
reforms such as Reagan's Tax Reform Act of 1986, which lowered the top statutory
rate from 50% to 28% (although the bottom tax rate increased by 4 percentage points).
Some smaller tax increases occurred during the early 1990s (e.g. a tax hike to high
income earners during Clinton's presidency increased the marginal tax rate of the top
decile from 31.3% to almost 33% in 1994).The increase of the average marginal tax rate
for the bottom decile since the end of the 1980s and even above the average marginal
tax rates of other deciles is the result of the expansion of the EITC.23
Panel B in Figure 2 shows the individual federal income tax rates for the PSID
households computed using the NBER calculator.24 The gure distinguishes between
tax rates before and after the Reagan 1968 reform. The plot shows the noticeable trans-
formation of the tax code following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which substantially
simplied the US tax code.
The high variation of taxes over time and across individuals depicted in Figure 2
supports the identication of the causal impact of tax reforms on income mobility.
3.3 The relationship between taxation and Income mobility
This subsections explores the relationship between income mobility and taxation at
the aggregate level. The correlation between the indices of mobility 1-IR and NTI
(described in Section 3.1) and the AMTR from Barro and Redlick (2011) ranges between
21See Figure A2 for the evolution of the average tax rate during the same period.
22Barro and Redlick (2011) uses data from a random sample on actual tax les and computes the
average marginal tax rate with TAXSIM.
23Note that while alterations of the EITC and other provisions have increased the average marginal
rate of the bottom deciles, the tax pressure of this group (as measured by the average tax rate shown
in Figure A2) has lowered since 1986.
24The PSID provided an estimation of the marginal tax rate on federal income during 1976-1991
based on question in the survey regarding exemptions, lling status, etc. The correlation with my
marginal tax rate computed through TAXSIM is above 90%. Butrica and Burkhauser (1997) explore
the dierences between the PSID simulations and TAXSIM.
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35-45%. However, the evolution of the AMTR is not exclusively restricted to taxes in
legislation, but also the result of macroeconomic developments (e.g. ination increasing
the taxable income of households and pushing them to higher tax brackets).
In order to isolate changes in the US tax code from macroeconomic developments, I
use the measure of legislated tax changes developed by Romer and Romer (2010). The
authors produce a narrative series of changes in federal tax revenues (as a percentage
of GDP) by documenting legislated tax changes in the postwar US. Table A1 shows the
correlation between the mobility indices mentioned in Section 3.1 and the Romer and
Romer (2010) measure of legislated tax changes (Romer). The relationship between tax
changes and mobility appears to be negative, albeit small. An OLS regression of the
percentage of households changing deciles (of net income) on the narrative series Romer
yields a slope coecient of 0:0159 (robust standard error of 0.0064), suggesting that
legislated tax changes that increase tax revenues by 1% of GDP reduces the percentage
of households changing deciles by about 1.6%.25
The correlations from Table A1 should not be given a causal interpretation. Legis-
lated changes in the tax code are sometimes the result of contemporaneous economic
developments, what could result in a problem of endogeneity when using aggregate data.
In this context, the observed negative correlation between mobility and taxes would be
the result of the state of the economy, as opposed to the disincentives produced by the
tax system.
To further explore the relationship between income mobility and taxes and the
direction of causality, I consider an alternative measure to Romer that only includes tax
changes not motivated by economic developments. Romer and Romer (2010) produce
such narrative by exploring the motivation behind each tax change and classifying them
as endogenous (motivated by economic meanings) or exogenous (motivated by ideology
or other concerns uncorrelated to the current state of the economy). Mertens and Ravn
(2013) and Mertens (2013) further rene this series by considering only those exogenous
tax changes that aect employment taxes or individual income that became eective
within one year of their legislation.26
Figure 3 plots the relationship between some relevant indices of mobility based on net
25The eect of Romer on other measures of mobility as described in Section 3.1 ranges between -
0.0242 and -0.0073 depending on the index considered, the denition of income, and number of income
ranks (deciles or quantiles). However, some of these coecients are estimated with high standard
errors.
26This last criterion accounts for the eect of anticipation (i.e. the case where the econometrician
has less information than the economic agents). See Mertens and Ravn (2011) and Mertens and Ravn
(2012) for an analysis and evidence on the eects of anticipation in taxes, and Ramey (2011) for the
case of anticipation in government spending.
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income (1-IR, NTI and the number of income thresholds passed) and the two narrative
measures of exogenous legislated tax changes ( exo TOT and  exo PI) described in the
previous paragraph. Large tax cuts seem to be associated with higher values of the
mobility indices (more relevant when considering the measure based on unanticipated
personal income tax changes,  exo PI). Correlations between these two variables range
from  11% to  35%. However, the limited number of tax changes meeting the above
criteria makes it dicult to obtain conclusive results from this preliminary analysis. The
next section analyses further this question by exploiting the disaggregated information
contained in the PSID data.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Estimation Strategy
The objective of this section is to quantify the eect of taxation on income mobility.
To estimate this eect I regress the marginal tax rate on measures of mobility that
vary on the denition of income and the number of ranks used to divide the income
distribution. I estimate the following regression:
mobilityi;t = A+Bi +Bt + i;t + Xi;t + "i;t (3)
where mobilityi;t 2 f0; 1g is a binary variable that takes value 1 when a household
changes to a dierent income rank between periods t 1 and t. Bi represents individual
xed eects that are assumed to remain constant over time. Bt represents time xed
eects which can have an inuence on the dependent variable at the aggregate level
(e.g. a macroeconomic shock aecting income mobility). i;t is the marginal tax rate of
individual i in time t computed using TAXSIM as explained in Section 3. Individual-
specic shocks to income mobility in period t are denoted by "i;t.
The impact of taxes on income mobility can be aected by dierent factors. Life-
cycle considerations are important since the decisions that determine income mobility
(labour income or asset income) can be dierent for younger or older households. Pref-
erences towards leisure can also vary over time, depending on the family composition.27
Additionally, health-related factors can potentially aect labour income and therefore,
27Labour supplied by the spouse is an important factor to take into account in this analysis since
married female workers have a more disperse distribution of hours worked and are, therefore, more
likely to be able to adjust their workload. See Blundell et al. (1998) for an investigation on the eects
of tax reforms on female labour supply.
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mobility.28 To account for all these factors, vector Xi;t in equation 3 includes the age of
the head and wife, the size of family, number of children below 18 in the household, a
dummy for a working spouse and a dummy for the health status of the head as control
variables.
I will consider specications where the dependent variable mobilityi;t diers in how
income is measured: income before federal taxes, income after federal taxes but before
transfers, and income after taxes and transfers.29 In this way, we will be able to
distinguish whether the potential impact of taxes on income mobility is restricted to the
redistributive eect of the tax and transfer system or has a more fundamental reason
such as aecting the labour supply choices (as described in Section 2). I will also
consider specications where the dependent variable mobilityi;t diers on how ranks
of the income distribution are dened, distinguishing between deciles and quintiles in
order to further support the robustness of the results.
4.2 Results from OLS regressions
Table 1 shows the results of estimating Equation 3 using OLS. The eect of the marginal
rate on the probability that the household moves to a dierent decile of pre-tax income
is negative and highly signicant: the point estimate is  0:383 (standard error of
0:06).30 The results are robust to the inclusion of control variables regarding life-cycle,
demographics, spouse labour supply or health status.
Table 2 explores the eects of taxation on alternative measures of income and income
ranks. Columns 1-3 report the impact on the probability of changing deciles of income
before taxes and transfers, income after taxes and before transfers, and income after
taxes and transfers, respectively. Columns 4-6 use the same measures of income but
consider instead the eects on the probability of changing quintiles of income. The
estimated coecient of the marginal tax rate is signicant above the 99% level for all
six specications. The size of the eect is about -0.40/-0.35 for most regressions, with
the specication that considers changes in quantiles of post-transfer income reporting
a slightly smaller estimate (-0.285). Overall, these result suggest that there is negative
28See French (2005) for an investigation on how health aects labour supply and retirement decisions.
29Transfers include both non-taxable public income (e.g. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) bene-
ts) and income transferred from other sources (e.g. relative). During the period considered, the PSID
does not oer exact information on public transfers alone (SSI is reported, but others are not) with
yearly frequency. However, the percentage of non-public income in the transfers variable considered
here was only about 0.4% in 1980, on average.
30Throughout this paper, models that estimate a binary outcome report estimates that can be
interpreted as percentage changes in probability. For example, an estimate of -0.383 represents a
-0.383% reduction of success of the dependent variable.
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relationship between taxes and income mobility.
4.3 Results from IV regressions
The US tax code is progressive and the marginal tax rate depends therefore on income.
This causes i;t in Equation 3 to be endogenous: when a shock "i;t aects income
positively, the household will be pushed to a higher tax bracket, and rendering the OLS
estimation of Equation 3 biased. In principle, the direction of the endogeneity bias
is not clear since it depends on how a shock to "i;t aects i;t. Consider the case of
a positive individual shock (e.g. a time varying preference shock) that raises income
and, as result of it, mobility. Since the individual will face a higher tax bracket, the
relationship between the shock and i;t is positive, making the OLS upward biased. In
the opposite case, a shock that decreases income (but still increases mobility) reduces
the tax bracket, inducing a downward bias in the OLS estimations. If we consider that
positive shocks to "i;t are more likely to drive income up (because households have more
margin to increase hours worked and income in the face of positive preference shocks
as opposed to shocks that make them willing to cut hours and income), then the rst
eect dominates, and the correlation between "i;t and i;t is positive, making the OLS
estimates biased towards positive values.
To address this problem of endogeneity, I construct an instrument that isolates the
variation in i;t that is only due to changes in the tax reforms.
31 The instrument is
dened as:
 t 1i;t = 
t
i;t    t 1i;t (4)
where  ti;t is the actual tax rate faced by household i, with income earned in time t
and employing the tax code for scal year t.  t 1i;t is the counterfactual tax rate that
a household i with current income from time t would have faced had the tax schedule
from time t   1 remained present. Both the actual and the counterfactual tax rates
are computed using TAXSIM as described in Section 3. When  t 1i;t is positive, a
household faces a higher tax pressure as a result of a scal reform. Conversely, negative
values of  t 1i;t indicates that tax reforms relevant for household i have resulted in
lower tax pressure.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the average of  t 1i;t for each income decile. The gure
illustrates the extent to which new tax legislation has aected federal income liabilities.
31This strategy has been also employed in the income elasticity literature: see Gruber and Saez
(2002) for an example and Saez et al. (2012) for a review of this literature and its identication
approaches.
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As mentioned in Section 3, the US has experienced several tax reforms during 1967-
1996. These reforms feature prominently in Figure 4, showing signicant variation
over time and across income deciles. These are the cases of, for example the generalised
decrease in statutory tax rates of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, or the increase in the rate
schedule of high income households as a result of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993. Panel B of Figure 4 shows the percentage of people in the sample that are
aected by tax reforms (i.e. those with  t 1i;t 6= 0). The gure shows that while some
reforms aected most of households (the case of tax legislation during 1980-1989), some
tax legislations only targeted low income earners (between 1974-1978), while others
were focused on richer households (the case of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993).32
Table 3 shows the results of estimating Equation 3 using tax reforms as an instru-
ment for the marginal tax rate.33 The estimated coecients of the marginal tax rates
are almost double the size compared to the OLS estimators, suggesting that the latter
suer from an upward bias. The probability of changing to a dierent decile of income
when the tax rate goes up by one percentage point is estimated to be reduced by about
0.8 percentage points (columns 1-3 in Table 3): -0.813 when using a pre-tax measure
of income or -0.769 when considering income after federal taxes, with a standard error
of 0.23.
The eect of taxes on mobility when using a distribution of income ordered in
quintiles is also negative, although slightly smaller in magnitude (but bigger in absolute
value than the equivalent OLS estimates). The probability that households' income
remains in the same quintile after an increase of one percentage point in the marginal
tax rate is estimated to be around 0.5% (columns 4-6 in Table 3), signicant at levels
of condence of 95%.
To understand the magnitude of this eect, consider a reduction in the marginal
rate of 7 percentage points, which is slightly smaller than the standard deviation of
non-zero changes in the actual tax rate i;t. The probability that a household moves to
a dierent decile in the income distribution increases by about 5.4-5.7% (depending on
the denition of income). Or, in other words, a 7 percentage point cut in the marginal
rate makes the household about 5.5% less likely to remain in the same income decile.
32A systematic correlation between income and changes in tax legislation would threat the validity
of  t 1i;t as an exogenous instrument. Including a long panel where tax reforms are the result of
dierent ideological positions mitigates this problem. Section 5 checks the robustness of the results to
including lag income (see Gruber and Saez (2002) for a discussion).
33The F-statistic from the rst-stage regressions shows a a very high value above 1500 for all the
specications, indicating that the instrument is relevant. Some specications reduce considerably this
value, although it always remains well above 10.
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This represents a tenth of the average likelihood of moving to a dierent income decile
within one year.34
The magnitudes are remarkably similar when considering movements across quintiles
of income. A 7 percentage point decrease in the marginal rate results in households
being around 3.5% more likely to move to a dierent income quintile. As before, this
also represents a tenth of the average probability of movement in the income quintile
distribution over the course of a year.
4.4 Average and marginal tax rates
Tax reforms can impact on eective marginal rates directly through changes in the
statutory tax rates or by introducing provisions that aect deductions, tax credits or
coverage. Therefore, while some changes in the US tax code have an eect through the
marginal tax rates, others reduce the tax liabilities and aect the average tax rate.
In this subsection I try to isolate the eects of changes in marginal tax rates i;t and
average marginal tax rates i;t, by exploiting variation over time and across individuals
in average and marginal tax rates. I estimate a version of Equation 3 that includes the
average tax rate i;t.
35 I construct an instrument in the same fashion as in Equation 4:
I compute the dierence between the actual average tax rate in time t and a counter-
factual average tax rate based on income obtained in time t taxed using the code of
year t  1. Figure A3 shows the evolution in time and across income deciles of this new
instrument.
Table 4 displays the results of estimating the impact of marginal tax rates and
average tax rates on dierent income mobility variables. The inclusion of the average
tax rate and the use of the new instrument mentioned in the previous paragraph,
increase the estimated coecients on the marginal tax rate. The eect of a percentage
point reduction in marginal tax rates fosters relative income mobility across deciles
(of pre-tax and post-tax income, columns 1 and 2 in Table 4) by about 1% (with a
standard errors of 0.18). Similarly, households are about 6% more likely to stay in the
same quintile of income when the marginal tax rates goes up by one percentage point
(columns 4-6 in Table 4).
While the coecient on marginal tax rate is signicant at condence levels above
99% across all specications, that of the average marginal tax rate is not. The reported
34The average probability of changing deciles between two years is 55% for the pre-tax and post-tax
denitions of income, and 57% for income post-transfers. The average likelihood of changing quintiles
of income is smaller: 35% for pre-tax and post-tax income and 36% for post-transfer income.
35Average tax rates are constructed by dividing federal income liabilities by income. Figure A2 plot
the evolution of these tax rates in the US between 1967 and 1996, averaged across income deciles.
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coecients are high and negative,36 but none of them are signicant at usual signicance
levels. Therefore, when both marginal and average tax rates are accounted for, only
the former has a signicant (and negative) eect on the relative mobility.
This evidence suggests that the economic mechanism that determines the eect of
taxes on income mobility is based on incentives (the substitution of leisure by labour
as shown in Section 2) as opposed to the wealth eects originated by a reduction in
available income. This view is consistent with Barro and Redlick (2011) and Mertens
(2013), who use time series evidence to analyse the impact of tax reforms. This nding
has important implications for the design of scal policy since reforms that provide
more incentives to work are more likely to foster income mobility as opposed to those
that only reduce tax pressure without aecting the marginal tax rate.37
5 Robustness
This section checks the robustness of previous results along several dimensions. Partic-
ularly, I depart from the benchmark estimations by considering alternative denitions
of distribution of income, adding further controls the regressions, including state and
payroll taxes, checking the stability of the results to samples that dier in time horizon
and selection criteria, employing and alternative measure to asses mobility and con-
sidering specication with dierent lags of the explanatory variables. The results from
this section contribute to support the evidence of the negative eect of taxes on income
mobility.
Alternative denitions of income. The results in Section 4 are based on measures
of income dened as Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) before taxes, after taxes but before
transfers and after taxes and transfers. Tables 5 and 6 report IV estimates of Equa-
tion 3 using alternative denitions of income to determine the probability of moving
to dierent ranks. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 report the estimated eect of marginal
tax rates on mobility across deciles of pre-taxes and post-taxes of joint taxable income
of head and wife. The coecients are slightly higher than those in Table 3, with IV
estimates close to -1 (and standard errors slightly above 0.2) and highly signicant.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 display the eects on income mobility based on labour
36With the exception of the specication in column 3 (using deciles of post-transfers income), where
the estimated coecient is close to zero but slightly positive.
37As an additional exercise to further support this claim, one could consider episodes of tax reforms
that did not aect marginal tax rates but reduced tax liabilities. These episodes are however very
scarce and usually much smaller in size, therefore I do not pursue this avenue.
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income of the head and wife. The point estimation when using pre-tax income is
slightly below -1 (-1.06, with standard error of 0.24) while it is somewhat smaller when
considering post-tax income (-0.74, with standard error of 0.24). Both estimates are
signicant at condence levels of 99%.38
Column 5 of Table 5 report the results when only asset income of the head and
wife is used to determine income mobility. The point estimate is, as expected, smaller
( 0:402) but signicant at levels of 90%. Column 6 considers a broader denition of
income that includes other sources of income from other people living in the family.39
The point estimation is also smaller (-0.472) but signicant as well.
Table 6 reports the same specications using the alternative measures of income, but
determining mobility in terms of quintiles of income. Results using the taxable income
and labour income of head and wife (columns 1-4) are highly signicant at levels of
99%. The magnitude of the eects when considering taxable income is about -0.63 and
0.72 (for post-tax and pre-tax income respectively, with standard errors of 0.23), and
higher when considering labour income (-1.03 for pre-tax income and -0.88 for post-
tax income, with same standard errors). The estimated coecients when considering
asset income or (adjusted) family income (columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 respectively) are
negative but small and not signicant.
Further controls. The benchmark estimates control for a number of life cycle and
demographic factors. Section 2 pointed out that accumulated wealth could reduce
mobility since households with higher asset income are less likely to move down the
income distribution when labour income is lower. Since information on wealth is not
measured frequently in the PSID during the period considered,40 I use net home equity
(self-reported house value minus the remaining mortgage on the house) to proxy for
net worth.41 Columns 1-3 in Table 7 report the IV estimates of the marginal tax rate
on income mobility when including wealth as a control. The coecient of this variable
(measured in thousands of 1996 dollars) is negative as expected: an increase of 100,000
in house equity increases the probability of staying in the same income decile by about
5%. The estimated coecient of the marginal tax rate is close to -0.8 for all three
38Interestingly, the estimated coecient on the dummy variable for working wife in the household
become larger and more signicant than in other specications.
39This measure of income is divided by the square root of the number of people living in the family
to adjust it for family size. See Jantti and Jenkins (2015).
40PSID data only includes snapshots of wealth for years 1984, 1989 and 1994, and since 1999 onwards.
41Information on household equity is included yearly in the PSID, with the exception of years 1973
and 1974. Fairlie and Krashinsky (2012) reports that net home equity represents 60% of the average
homeowner wealth (64% for the median homeowner).
21
specications considered (which vary in how income is measured) and remains highly
signicant (at levels of 99%).
Next, I consider dummy variables of the position in the income distribution in year
t 1 as controls. This aims to take into account two potential issues. First, the previous
position in the income distribution can be informative of the likelihood of moving to
other income rank. And second, related to the previous point, people positioned in the
rst or last income rank (e.g. the 1st and 10th decile) are, by denition, less likely
to move (since their movements are restricted to one direction). Columns 4-6 of in
Table 7 shows the results of including these new controls. The new variables have
large and positive estimated coecients,42 which seem to suggest that households with
income belonging to the central part of the distribution (deciles 4-7) are more likely to
experience movements along the income ranks. Regarding the estimated coecients on
the marginal tax rates, controlling for the previous position in the income distribution
reduces the impact of marginal tax rates slightly (by about 0.1 percentage points), but
the coecients remain signicant at condence levels of 99%.
As discussed in Section 4, a systematic relation between the instrument  t 1i;t and
previous income levels can lead to biased estimations if the error term "i;t in Equation 3
also depends on previous income. To address this issue, columns 1-3 in Table 8 report
the eect of marginal tax rates on the probability of income mobility when controlling
for previous income (measured by AGI). The inclusion of the variable supports the
validity of the instrument while also controls for non-labour income (e.g. asset income).
The estimated coecients are not noticeably changed with respect to the main results
(see Table 3), and remain in the region of -0.8 (standard errors of 0.22) and statistically
signicant at levels of condence of 99%.
Lastly, columns 4-6 in Table 8 include absolute changes in income (AGI) as an
additional control. By denition of the mobility variables (which capture the probability
that income in period t belongs to a dierent income rank than that of period t 1), this
variable explain most of the likelihood of relative income movements. The inclusion of
this variable strengthens the eect of marginal tax rate on income mobility by about 0.2
percentage points: the estimated coecients become close to -1 (with standard errors
of 0.22), while remaining signicant.
State and Payroll tax rates. So far, only federal income tax liabilities have been
considered in the analysis. However, the total eective tax pressure in the US also
42This specication highlights a common problem with linear probability models: the sum of the
estimated coecients can be in excess of 100, which is not conceptually possible.
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includes payroll tax liabilities (FICA) and state-level tax liabilities. Payroll taxes are
charged at the federal level to both employees and employers in order to fund social
benets programs (Social Security and Medicare). The FICA marginal tax rate has
been relatively low until 1979 with substantially less variation than federal income
taxes.43 On the other hand, TAXSIM can only compute marginal tax rates at the state
level from 1977.
To check the robustness of the results to the inclusion of payroll and state tax li-
abilities, I compute the marginal and average tax rate on total tax liabilities (federal
income, FICA and sate) from 1978 to 1996 using TAXSIM.44 The number of available
observations in the PSID sample is reduced by about a third, down to about 35,400.
Table 9 shows the estimated coecients of the marginal tax rate on the probability of
changing deciles (columns 1-3) and quintiles (columns 4-6) of income. The estimated
coecients are lower by about 0.25 percentage points when compared to those in Ta-
ble 3, but still signicant across all specications considered at condence levels of at
least 90%. When considering pretax income, household are 0.565% (standard error of
0.20) less likely to move to a dierent income decile when the marginal tax rate goes up
by one percentage point. Specications considering transition across income quantiles
report estimated coecients ranging from -0.38 to -0.33 (with standard errors of 0.19
and 0.20).
Sample stability. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 had a substantial impact on the
US tax code in many dierent dimensions (e.g. signicant cuts in statutory tax rates,
elimination of several provisions). To account for potential sample instability in the
estimations due to this major reform, Table 10 reports the coecients of marginal tax
rates and average tax rates on the probability of moving to a dierent decile of income
considering a sample before 1986 (columns 1-3) and from 1986 onwards (columns 4-
6). The dierences in the coecients before and after are not statistically dierent
from each other (probably because of the higher standard errors resulting from lower
sample size). For example, the estimated coecient of the marginal tax rate is -0.835
(standard error of 0.41) considering pre-tax income before 1986, and -1.018 (standard
error of 0.26) after 1986. All the estimated coecients are statistically signicantly
dierent from 0 at condence levels of 99%.
The estimated coecients do however show dierences between before and after
43FICA marginal tax rate has averaged 0.03% between 1967 and 1978. Its standard deviation
between 1967-1996 is half of the federal income tax rates, and about a third of it during 1967-1997.
See Barro and Redlick (2011).
44Figure A4 plots the variation across individuals in total marginal tax rates during this period.
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1986. While the coecients are always negative, they are not signicant after 1986
(in line with the results from Table 4) and signicant across some specications (using
pre-tax and post-tax income) before 1986.This could suggest that the eect of average
tax rates diminishes when taxes and, most noticeably, transfers are introduced (before
1986). However, a counterfactual analysis of tax reforms would be required to add
support to this interpretation.
Sample selection. The PSID sample selected for this paper responds to the goal
of targeting households that are actively involved in the labour market. I now check
whether the results presented in Section 4 are robust to dierent sample specications.
As described in Section 3, PSID includes two subsamples: a US-representative sam-
ple (core or SRC sample) and a sub-sample that over-represents low-income (the Survey
of Economic Opportunity, SEO, a project from which PSID was originated). To insure
representability, the PSID provides weights to account for dierent sampling probabil-
ities and attrition. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 11 presents results when only the core
sample (and no weights) are used. This represents a reduction of almost 40% in the
sample size. However, the estimated eect of marginal tax rates on the probability
of changing income deciles is still negative and highly signicant at 99%: point esti-
mates of -0.95 and -0.72 (standard errors of 0.25) when considering pre-tax and post-tax
income respectively.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 11 display the estimations based on a sample that ad-
ditionally includes households with a head younger than 25 or older than 60 years.45
The estimated coecients of the marginal tax rates are smaller (but still signicant
at condence levels of 90%), suggesting that the income mobility of very young or old
households is not as much determined by changes in taxation compared to households
with a head aged 25-60.
Next, I consider whether the benchmark sample criteria may induce a bias due to
households being self selected into groups. These would be the case if higher taxes
aect the decision of work at the extensive margin (a head of household decides to
become unemployed when taxes go up) or to become self-employed.46 To address this,
columns 3 and 4 of Table 11 report the estimates when the sample is extended to include
households with a self-employed status. The point estimates of the eect of marginal
tax rates remain similar (and highly signicant) to the benchmark estimations: -0.88
45These thresholds are often considered to determine the prime age for labour market engagement.
See for example Keane (2011).
46The potential eect of taxes on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur is further discussed
in Section 7.
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(standard error of 0.20) and -0.84 (standard error of 0.21) when considering pre-tax
and post-tax income, respectively.
Alternatively, columns 5 and 6 display the estimates when the sample also includes
households whose head is unemployed.47 Marginal tax rates are estimated to reduce
income mobility by 0.72 and 0.74% (for pre-tax and post-tax income, respectively;
standard errors of 0.22). These coecients are statistically signicant at condence
levels of 99%.
Lastly, I extend the sample to include families whose head is a female.48 Columns
9 and 11 show the estimates when considering this enlarged sample (these include a
dummy variable for male heads). The estimated coecients are quantitatively similar
to the benchmark results, and marginal taxes are found to increase the probability
of households remaining in the same pre-tax income decile by about 0.6% (0.8% for
post-tax income, standard errors of 0.23 and 0.24, respectively).
Alternative dependent variable. The dependent variable mobilityi;t used in the
main results exploits the information in the diagonal of the probability matrix P in
Equation 2: it computes the probability that a household with income belonging to
rank k in period t   1 remains in the same position in time t. An alternative way to
measure mobility is to calculate the number of income ranks that a household crosses
when moving in the income distribution. For example, this new variable, jumpi;t, takes
value of 3 if a household moves in the income distribution from income decile k in time
t  1 to income rank k + 3 or k   3 in period t. Hence, this allows to analyse mobility
by eectively using information in the rest of the cells in matrix P apart from those in
its diagonal.49
Table 12 reproduces the main results of Table 3 but switching the dependent variable
mobilityi;t by the newly created measure of mobility jumpi;t.
50 A cut in the marginal
tax rate of 1 percentage point increases the average number of income deciles that a
household would cross while moving in the pre-tax income distribution by 0.013 (stan-
dard error of 0.001, column 1 of Table 12). The estimated coecient when considering
a post-tax income distribution is very similar (point estimate of -0.012, standard er-
47A dummy for heads who are employed is added to these specications.
48PSID usually assigns the role of the head of the household to a male when he is present. But in
some, occasions this role corresponds to the wife (e.g. when the female prefers to be designated as the
head).
49The average of variable jumpi;t in the sample is 0.89. The average number of income ranks crossed
by those who move in the income distribution is 1.61.
50Estimations in Table 12 also include the average tax rate as an explanatory variable. The estimated
coecients on the marginal tax rates remain quantitatively the same when average tax rate is not
included, but are estimated with higher standard errors, reducing their statistical signicance.
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ror of 0.01, column 2) and slightly smaller (point estimate of -0.008, column 3) when
considering a post-transfers income distribution.
Results are, as expected, reduced by half when the number of ranks are lowered from
10 (deciles) to 5 (quintiles). Columns 4-6 of Table 12 report these results, with point
estimates between -0.005 and -0.006 depending on the measure of income considered.
All the coecients of the marginal tax rates on Table 12 are signicant at condence
levels of 95%.
Dynamic specications. Following the model described in Section 2, the eect of
taxation on the probability of income mobility is determined in the labour market,
which is the result of a static optimisation problem. There are however reasons for
believing the idea that this eect could have some dynamic structure. For example,
decisions on changes in asset income as a result of variation in taxes may take more
than a period to take eect (since wealth accumulation is the result of an inter-temporal
problem).
To account for these eects, I estimate versions of Equation 3 that dier in the dy-
namic eect of the marginal tax rate i;t on the probability of income mobility. Table 13
(columns 1 and 2) reports the estimated coecients of the marginal tax rate when its
eect is assumed to be lagged one period. The point estimates (-0.57 and -0.41 for pre-
tax and post-tax income specications; standard errors of 0.24) are smaller although
still signicantly dierent from zero (at levels of condence of 90 and 95%). When the
tax rate is lagged two periods (columns 3 and 4), the eect is positive but insignicant
when considering pre-tax income, and positive and only marginally signicant when
considering post-tax income.51 Further lags of the tax rate results on negative but
insignicant coecients: columns 5 and 6 report the estimates for t 3. Lags beyond
3 remain negative but are usually insignicant (not reported). These results suggest
that the eect of taxes on income mobility is most noticeable on impact and during the
following year. I do not nd signicant evidence on the eect of tax reforms on income
mobility beyond that time.
Table 13 replicates the robustness check described in the previous paragraph but
considering mobility across income quintiles. As with the case of deciles, the estimated
coecients on the lagged marginal tax rate are negative and signicant (above 95%),
but slightly higher: -0.79 and -0.53 (with standard errors of 0.23 and 0.24) for the spec-
ications of pre-tax and post-tax income. Lagging the marginal rate further, results in
51This is the only specication where the eect of i;t 2 is both positive and signicant. Specications
when considering income quintiles (see Table14), post-transfer income (not reported) or further controls
(not reported) do not nd this coecient to be signicant.
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estimated coecients not statistically dierent from 0 (in the case of a two-period lag,
the coecients are positive and insignicant, but become negative -and still insigni-
cant, for long horizons).
6 Additional Evidence on Taxation and Mobility
6.1 The heterogenous eects of taxes
This subsection analyses how dierent are the eects of changes in marginal taxation
on income mobility across dierent levels of education. The degree of education can
be a proxy for labour market skills. It is therefore interesting to analyse the income
mobility dynamics for two sub-samples: households led by a head that has completed
college education and households whose head has a level of education below college
graduate.
I now re-estimate Equation 3 with dierent dependent variables. First, I create a
binary variable to describe upward movements in the income distribution, upi;t, taking
value 1 when the income of a households move up to a higher income rank. Similarly,
I create a variable that considers downward movements in the income distribution,
downi;t (with value of 1 when income rank moves to a lower position). For comparison
I also dene a variable determining immobility as stayi;t = 1 mobilityi;t.
Table 15 shows the estimated coecients of the marginal tax rates in the income
mobility variables described in the previous paragraph for the sample of non-college
households.52 It is worth noting that, for this sample of non-college graduates, the
spouse's participation in the labour market is an important determinant of income
mobility: a working spouse increases the likelihood of moving up by about 17% (columns
1 and 2, standard error of 1.09), while it reduces the probability of moving down by
about 18% (columns 5 and 6, standard error of 1.44). A one percentage point increase
in the marginal tax rate increases the probability of moving down to lower deciles
of income by about 1% (columns 5 and 6, standard error of 0.4) and increases the
likelihood of moving up in the income distribution to a higher extent, by around 1.5%
(columns 1 and 2, standard errors of 0.27). Consistently with the results of Table 3,
52The estimated coecients for the mobility variables are related by move = up + down, where
move =  stay. In the regressions shown in Tables 15 and 15 we have that up+stay+down is not
usually 0. This is due to dierences in the samples used: specications for variable upi;t (columns 1 and
2) exclude households with an income in time t   1 belonging to the 10th decile, while specications
for variable downi;t (columns 5 and 6) exclude households with an income in time t   1 belonging
to the 1st decile. This sample adjustment is done to account for the fact that households in the top
(bottom) decile cannot experience further upward (downward) movements in the income distribution.
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higher tax rates lead to a higher probability of remaining in the same income decile:
point estimates of 0.915% and 0.728% (standard errors of 0.26) for specications of
pre-tax income (column 3) and post-tax income (column 4).53
Table 16 reports the results for a sub-sample of households led by a head with
completed college education. The estimated coecient on the dummy of working spouse
is still large and signicant, but smaller compared to those in Table 15.54 Marginal tax
rates are found to reduce the probability of moving down in the income distribution
(columns 5 and 6), with point estimates of -1 and -1.3 (standard errors of 0.49) for
the pre-tax and post-tax specications, respectively. The eect on the probability of
moving up in the income distribution, despite being positive, is not signicant at usual
condence levels. For this sub-sample, higher tax rates also reduce mobility: by 1.1%
when considering a distribution of post-tax income, although the point estimate of 0.5
is not signicant for specications of pre-tax income (standard errors of 0.51 in both
cases).
To sum up, higher marginal tax rates increase mobility in both samples (less clearly
in the case of college graduates). But the eects on upward and downward mobility
are the opposite: non-college are, on average, more likely to move down in the income
distribution, while college households are likely to move up (or, at least, less likely to
move down) as a result of an increase in the marginal tax rates. These results, although
should be taken with caution due to the increased uncertainty resulting from smaller
samples, have important policy implications. Fiscal reforms that homogeneously reduce
marginal tax rates seem to contribute to income mobility by making households with
non-college education more likely to occupy relatively higher positions within the income
distribution (and vice versa for college-graduated households).
6.2 Do taxes increase mobility at the tails of the distribution?
This subsection analyses how changes in taxation aect mobility at the tails of the
income distribution. Particularly, I estimate the eect of changes in the marginal tax
rates on the probability that households in the bottom or top deciles of income remain
in that position.
As in the previous subsection, I estimate Equation 3 with dierent dependent vari-
able. For households in the bottom decile of income, I construct a new dependent
53The results in the regressions in Tables 15 and 15 are robust to the inclusion of lag income as and
additional control (not reported).
54This is probably the result of a higher percentage of employed wifes in the college-graduated sample
(75% versus 68%).
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(binary) variable, upi;t, that takes value of 1 when the household moves up to a dif-
ferent decile. Similarly, variable downi;t takes value of 1 when a household in the top
decile of income moves down in the distribution.55
Table 17 reports the estimates for households in the bottom decile (columns 1-3)
and households in the top decile (4-5). The eect of an increase in the marginal tax rate
on the probability that a poor households climbs to an upper position of the income
distribution is negative and highly signicant: point estimates range between -1.71 and
-1.44 (standard errors of 0.23-0.26).
To understand the magnitude of this eect, consider a decrease of the marginal
tax rate by 7 percentage points. This tax cut can explain around a quarter of the
probability of leaving the bottom decile.56
The eect of tax rates on mobility in the top decile is less clear. The point esti-
mates are negative, what would suggest that higher taxes increase the probability that
households in the top decile remain in that position. However, the point estimates are
associated to very high standard errors (in excess of 0.90) and therefore not signicant
at conventional levels.
7 Conclusion
Rising inequality has triggered a debate on what is the role that scal policy should play
in addressing economic disparities. However, taxes are likely to have an impact on other
features of the income distribution beyond inequality. This paper considers the eect of
scal policy on income mobility. I exploit the variation in marginal tax rates originated
by several reforms in the US to estimate how likely is that the relative position of a
household in the income distribution changes when taxes vary. The resulting evidence
suggest that lower marginal tax rates foster mobility along the income distribution.
Particularly, an increase of one percentage point in the marginal tax rate causes a decline
of around 0.8% in the probability that a household's income changes to a dierent decile
of the income distribution. A change in the marginal tax rate of 7 percentage points
accounts for around a tenth of the average likelihood of movements in the income
distribution (and around a quarter of the average probability that a household in the
bottom decile moves to a higher position). The mechanism that brings about this eect
seems to be based on the distortions induced by taxes in the labour market decisions.
55The aggregate probability of moving away from the tails of the income distribution, i.e. 1  P 1;1
and 1  P 10;10 of mobility matrix P in Equation 2 are shown in Figure A1.
56The average likelihood of leaving the bottom decile is 45%.
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These empirical results have important implications for the design of scal policy.
Tax reforms that reduce marginal rates are more likely to increase equality of oppor-
tunity (as measured by the degree of income mobility). This is because an attenuation
of the distortionary eects of taxes in the labour market would make households more
likely to take advantage of economic opportunities and move up in the income distribu-
tion. Therefore, scal policies that aim to reduce inequality should weight the trade-o
in households' welfare induced by the eect on income mobility.
This analysis can be extended in several ways. First, this paper highlights the
need to address the potentially dierent eects of taxation on income inequality and
income mobility. A comprehensive analysis of scal policy should jointly address these
issues. The interaction of a progressive tax schedule with income inequality and mobility
necessitates a structural general equilibrium model that generates heterogeneity in the
spirit of Aiyagari (1994) while allowing for relevant labour supply decisions. This
framework would allow for a quantication of the impact of welfare of scal policies
that address inequality, both in terms of income and wealth.
This paper has restricted its attention to mobility in the short run. Another in-
teresting avenue is to explore the eects of taxation on social (or intergenerational)
mobility. A low degree of association between parents' and children's income is an indi-
cator of higher equality of opportunity. Nybom and Stuhler (2014) note the importance
of shocks aecting the parents in determining current intergenerational mobility. It is
therefore highly relevant from a policy standpoint to understand whether major scal
reforms as Tax Revenue Act of 1986 can have a noticeable impact on children's future
position in the income distribution.
Finally, my analysis can also be extended to understand the eects of taxation on
other dimensions such as job mobility and the decision of becoming an entrepreneur.
The macroeconomic literature that investigates the sources of wealth inequality has
often relied on entrepreneurship as a key element to understand why rich households
accumulate so much wealth (see De Nardi (2015)).57 Whether the incidence of personal
income or corporate income taxation is a factor determining the decision to become
self-employed (beyond wealth accumulation) has important policy implications.
57However, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) highlights that wealth accumulation is only an important
factor on the entrepreneurial decisions for those individuals above the 95% percentile of wealth.
30
References
Aaronson, D. and French, E. (2009). The Eects of Progressive Taxation on Labor
Supply when Hours and Wages are Jointly Determined. Journal of Human Resources,
44(2):386{408.
Aghion, P., Akcigit, U., Bergeaud, A., Blundell, R., and Hemous, D. (2015). Innovation
and Top Income Inequality. Working paper, Harvard University.
Aiyagari, S. R. (1994). Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 109(3):659{684.
Arrow, K. J. and Intriligator, M. D. (2015). Introduction to the Series. In Atkinson,
A. B. and Bourguignon, F., editors, Handbook of Income Distribution, volume 2 of
Handbook of Income Distribution, pages xvii {lxiii. Elsevier.
Barro, R. J. and Redlick, C. J. (2011). Macroeconomic Eects from Government Pur-
chases and Taxes. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1):51{102.
Bartholomew, D. (1973). Stochastic Models for Social Processes. Wiley series in prob-
ability and mathematical statistics. J. Wiley.
Blundell, R., Duncan, A., and Meghir, C. (1998). Estimating Labor Supply Responses
Using Tax Reforms. Econometrica, 66(4):827{861.
Bradbury, K. L. (2011). Trends in US Family Income Mobility, 1969-2006. Working
Papers 11-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
Butrica, B. A. and Burkhauser, R. V. (1997). Estimating Federal Income Tax Burdens
for Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) Families Using the National Bureau of
Economic Research TAXSIM Model. Syracuse University Center for Policy Research
Aging Studies Program Paper, 12.
Chetty, R. and Hendren, N. (2015). The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational
Mobility: Childhood Exposure Eects and County-Level Estimates. Working paper,
Harvard University.
Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Kline, P., and Saez, E. (2014a). Where is the Land of Oppor-
tunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States. Working
Paper 19843, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Kline, P., Saez, E., and Turner, N. (2014b). Is the United
States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergenerational Mobility.
Working Paper 19844, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Council of Economic Advisers (2015). Economic Report of the President. USA Gov-
ernment Printing Oce, Washington.
De Nardi, M. (2015). Quantitative Models of Wealth Inequality: A Survey. Working
Paper 21106, National Bureau of Economic Research.
31
Diamond, P. and Saez, E. (2011). The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research
to Policy Recommendations. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(4):165{190.
Fairlie, R. W. and Krashinsky, H. A. (2012). Liquidity Constraints, Household Wealth,
and Entrepreneurship Revisited. Review of Income and Wealth, 58(2):279{306.
Feenberg, D. and Coutts, E. (1993). An Introduction to the TAXSIM Model. Journal
of Policy Analysis and Management, 12(1):189{194.
Fields, G. and Ok, E. (1999). The Measurement of Income Mobility: An Introduction
to the Literature. In Silber, J., editor, Handbook of Income Inequality Measurement,
volume 71 of Recent Economic Thought Series, pages 557{598. Springer Netherlands.
French, E. (2005). The Eects of Health, Wealth, and Wages on Labour Supply and
Retirement Behaviour. Review of Economic Studies, 72(2):395{427.
Gittleman, M. and Joyce, M. (1999). Have Family Income Mobility Patterns Changed?
Demography, 36(3):299{314.
Gottschalk, P. (1997). Inequality, Income Growth, and Mobility: The Basic Facts.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(2):21{40.
Gruber, J. and Saez, E. (2002). The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and
Implications. Journal of Public Economics, 84(1):1{32.
Hart, P. (1976). The Comparative Statics and Dynamics of Income Distributions.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A, 139(1):108{125.
Heathcote, J., Storesletten, K., and Violante, G. L. (2009). Quantitative Macroeco-
nomics with Heterogeneous Households. Annual Review of Economics, 1(1):319{354.
Hungerford, T. L. (1993). US Income Mobility in the Seventies and Eighties. Review
of Income and Wealth, 39(4):403{417.
Hurst, E. and Lusardi, A. (2004). Liquidity Constraints, Household Wealth, and En-
trepreneurship. Journal of Political Economy, 112(2):319{347.
Jantti, M. and Jenkins, S. P. (2015). Income Mobility. In Atkinson, A. B. and Bour-
guignon, F., editors, Handbook of Income Distribution, volume 2 of Handbook of
Income Distribution, pages 807 { 935. Elsevier.
Keane, M. P. (2011). Labor Supply and Taxes: A Survey. Journal of Economic Liter-
ature, 49(4):961{1075.
Kopczuk, W., Saez, E., and Song, J. (2010). Earnings Inequality and Mobility in the
United States: Evidence from Social Security Data Since 1937. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 125(1):91{128.
32
Larrimore, J., Mortenson, J., Splinter, D., et al. (2015). Income and Earnings Mobility
in US Tax Data. Working paper, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(US).
Lerman, R. I. and Yitzhaki, S. (1995). Changing Ranks and the Inequality Impacts of
Taxes and Transfers. National Tax Journal, 48(1):pp. 45{59.
Mertens, K. (2013). Marginal Tax Rates and Income: New Time Series Evidence.
Working Paper 19171, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Mertens, K. and Ravn, M. O. (2011). Understanding the Aggregate Eects of An-
ticipated and Unanticipated Tax Policy Shocks. Review of Economic Dynamics,
14(1):27{54.
Mertens, K. and Ravn, M. O. (2012). Empirical Evidence on the Aggregate Eects of
Anticipated and Unanticipated US Tax Policy Shocks. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 4(2):145{81.
Mertens, K. and Ravn, M. O. (2013). The Dynamic Eects of Personal and Corporate
Income Tax Changes in the United States. American Economic Review, 103(4):1212{
47.
Nybom, M. and Stuhler, J. (2014). Interpreting Trends in Intergenerational Mobility.
Working paper, Universidad Carlos III.
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Harvard University Press.
Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2003). Income Inequality in the United States, 1913{1998.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1):1{41.
Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2007). How Progressive is the US Federal Tax System? A
Historical and International Perspective. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(1):3{
24.
Quadrini, V. and Ros-Rull, J.-V. (2015). Inequality in Macroeconomics. In Atkinson,
A. B. and Bourguignon, F., editors, Handbook of Income Distribution, volume 2 of
Handbook of Income Distribution, pages 1229 { 1302. Elsevier.
Ramey, V. (2011). Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It's All in the Timing.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1):1.
Romer, C. and Romer, D. (2010). The Macroeconomic Eects of Tax Changes: Es-
timates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks. American Economic Review,
100(3):763{801.
Saez, E., Slemrod, J., and Giertz, S. H. (2012). The Elasticity of Taxable Income with
Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review. Journal of Economic Literature,
pages 3{50.
33
Saez, E. and Zucman, G. (2014). Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913:
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data. Working Paper 20625, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Shorrocks, A. (1978a). Income Inequality and Income Mobility. Journal of Economic
Theory, 19(2):376 { 393.
Shorrocks, A. F. (1978b). The Measurement of Mobility. Econometrica, 46(5):1013{
1024.
Slemrod, J. (1996). High-Income Families and the Tax Changes of the 1980s: The
Anatomy of Behavioral Response. In Feldstein, M. and Poterba, J., editors, Empirical
foundations of household taxation, pages 169{192. University of Chicago Press.
Stiglitz, J. (2012). The price of inequality. Penguin UK.
Zidar, O. M. (2015). Tax Cuts For Whom? Heterogeneous Eects of Income Tax
Changes on Growth and Employment. Working Paper 21035, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
34
Figure 1: Evolution of mobility indices (1967-1996)
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Note: Evolution of indices of mobility between 1967-1996. Blue line (move) is 1-IR, i.e. the percentage
of people that change income deciles after a year. Red line (trace) is the normalised trace indicator,
dened as NTI= N trace(P )N 1 . The green line (jump) represents the average number of income classes
(e.g. deciles) than a household goes through after a year. The yellow line (correl) is one minus the
absolute correlation of income between two adjacent years. The denition of income is Adjusted Gross
Income (AGI) before taxes. The evolution is very similar when using denitions of income after taxes
or after taxes and transfers.
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Figure 2: Variation in Marginal Tax Rates (1967-1996)
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Note: Panel A shows the evolution between 1967-1996 of the average marginal tax rates for each income
decile (solid lines) calculated using TAXSIM and PSID data. The dashed line is the economy-wise
average marginal tax rate from Barro and Redlick (2011). Panel B shows the relationship between
the federal marginal rates on individual income for each household and year in the PSID before and
after the 1986 tax reform (in red and blue, respectively) and the real Adjusted Gross Income (in 1996
dollars). 36
Figure 3: Relationship between taxes (R&R, exogenous) and mobility
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Note: Relationship between indices of mobility and tax changes. Graphs in the left column depict the
correlation of mobility with the narrative measure of unanticipated exogenous legislated tax changes
(as percentage of nominal GDP) from Romer and Romer (2010). Graphs in the right column use a
subset of the Romer and Romer series that only considers legislated tax changes that directly aect
individual income tax (as a percentage of reported income) from Mertens (2013). Mobility indices are
the percentage of people changing income deciles (rst row), the normalised trace index (NTI, second
row) and the average number of income thresholds passed by a household between two adjacent years.
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Figure 4: The evolution of tax reforms (1967-1996)
PANEL A: Variations in the tax rate due to legislated tax changes








	

	

 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 





	









PANEL B: Percentage of households aected by tax reforms
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Note: Panel A shows the evolution between 1967 and 1996 of the instrument  t 1i;t = 
t
i;t    t 1i;t
(dierence between the actual marginal tax rate and a counterfactual marginal tax rate computed
using TAXSIM). Grey bars represent the narrative measure of legislated tax changes (as percentage of
nominal GDP) from Romer and Romer (2010). These are classied as endogenous tax changes (related
to the current state of the economy, in light grey) and exogenous tax changes (unrelated to the state of
economy, in dark grey). Panel B shows the (weighted) percentage of people for each decile of income
that experience a change in their marginal tax rate in a given year, i.e.  t 1i;t 6= 0.
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Table 1: OLS estimation (with dierent controls)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-tax
t -0.383
 -0.381 -0.390 -0.402 -0.401
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
age (H) -0.578 -0.618 -0.620 -0.622
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
age (W) 0.136 0.134 0.134 0.132
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
family size -0.511 -0.533 -0.535
(0.66) (0.65) (0.65)
num children -0.308 -0.268 -0.264
(0.65) (0.65) (0.65)
working wife 0.972 0.972
(0.85) (0.85)
health status 1.084
(1.26)
N 50769 50748 50748 50748 50748
Note: OLS estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to a dierent
decile of post-tax income. Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time
and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue p < 0:1, 
pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 2: OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
post-trans
t -0.399
 -0.401 -0.350 -0.354 -0.407 -0.285
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
age (H) -0.672 -0.622 -0.257 -0.930 -0.723 -0.473
(0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.35) (0.37)
age (W) 0.110 0.132 -0.169 0.503 0.322 0.130
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.34) (0.36)
family size -0.316 -0.535 -0.826 -0.173 -0.638 -0.617
(0.68) (0.65) (0.65) (0.63) (0.65) (0.66)
num children -0.163 -0.264 0.008 -0.589 -0.186 -0.134
(0.68) (0.65) (0.66) (0.63) (0.64) (0.67)
working wife 0.951 0.972 0.542 -0.242 0.187 -0.822
(0.83) (0.85) (0.91) (0.83) (0.84) (0.94)
health status 0.575 1.084 0.340 -1.599 -0.093 -2.843
(1.23) (1.26) (1.32) (1.28) (1.28) (1.27)
N 50748 50748 47890 50748 50748 47890
Note: OLS estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to a dierent
decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Specications also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax
AGI, post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions
use panel data and include time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in
brackets.  pvalue p < 0:1,  pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 3: IV estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
post-trans
i;t -0.813
 -0.769 -0.775 -0.516 -0.478 -0.506
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
age (H) -0.582 -0.542 4.481 -0.895 -0.708 2.560
(0.27) (0.27) (1.87) (0.26) (0.27) (1.76)
age (W) 0.078 0.104 -0.198 0.490 0.317 0.114
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
family size -0.206 -0.437 -0.695 -0.130 -0.619 -0.548
(0.60) (0.61) (0.64) (0.58) (0.58) (0.62)
num children -0.418 -0.490 -0.261 -0.688 -0.230 -0.274
(0.61) (0.62) (0.65) (0.59) (0.59) (0.62)
working wife 1.927 1.839 1.549 0.140 0.355 -0.297
(0.96) (0.97) (0.99) (0.95) (0.95) (0.98)
health status 0.250 0.794 0.028 -1.727 -0.149 -3.006
(1.25) (1.26) (1.32) (1.22) (1.23) (1.28)
1st stage F-stat 1577 1577 1602 1577 1577 1602
N 50745 50745 47791 50745 50745 47791
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to a dierent
decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal tax rate
 . Specications also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and post-tax and
post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and
individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue p < 0:1,  pvalue
p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 4: IV Estimation with average tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
post-trans
t -1.028
 -0.993 -0.771 -0.590 -0.627 -0.561
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
t -4.037 -4.209 0.092 -1.391 -2.798 -1.167
(3.71) (3.77) (3.50) (2.98) (3.16) (3.35)
age (H) -0.077 -0.016 4.462 -0.721 -0.358 2.801
(0.51) (0.52) (2.00) (0.42) (0.45) (1.89)
age (W) -0.151 -0.135 -0.194 0.411 0.158 0.055
(0.34) (0.34) (0.32) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31)
family size 0.465 0.263 -0.710 0.102 -0.154 -0.353
(0.84) (0.85) (0.83) (0.73) (0.76) (0.79)
num children -4.534 -4.781 -0.170 -2.107 -3.083 -1.430
(3.73) (3.79) (3.42) (2.98) (3.16) (3.27)
working wife 10.105 10.365 1.365 2.959 6.022 2.048
(7.19) (7.30) (6.67) (5.67) (6.04) (6.37)
health status -1.860 -1.404 0.074 -2.454 -1.611 -3.589
(2.22) (2.24) (2.08) (1.86) (1.95) (2.00)
1st stage F-stat 944 944 949 944 944 949
N 50745 50745 47791 50745 50745 47791
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal and average tax rates on the probability of moving
to a dierent decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Tax reforms are used as instruments for the marginal
tax rate t and the average tax rate t. Specications also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax
AGI and post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions
use panel data and include time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in
brackets.  pvalue p < 0:1,  pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 5: Robustness to alternative denitions of income (deciles)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tax inc.
(pre-tax)
tax inc.
(post-tax)
labour inc.
(pre-tax)
labour inc.
(post-tax)
asset inc.
(pre-tax)
fam. inc.
(pre-tax)
i;tt -0.979
 -0.939 -1.065 -0.742 -0.402 -0.473
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23)
age (H) -0.775 -0.418 -0.684 -0.640 -0.692 1.410
(0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26)
age (W) 0.298 -0.013 0.170 0.243 0.475 -0.128
(0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
family size -0.756 -0.572 -0.304 -0.091 3.891 0.560
(0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.62) (0.61) (0.59)
num children -0.528 -0.492 -0.991 -1.397 -5.090 -1.752
(0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.60)
working wife 2.271 2.350 3.857 2.944 0.813 1.158
(0.96) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.93)
health stastus 1.678 0.865 0.767 0.644 3.081 -0.324
(1.25) (1.27) (1.26) (1.27) (1.28) (1.23)
1st stage F-stat 1577 1577 1577 1577 1577 1577
N 50745 50745 50745 50745 50745 50745
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to a dierent
decile of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal tax rate  . Specications
dier in how income is dened: columns 1-2 refer to taxable income of head and wife, columns 3-4
refer to labour income of head and wife, column 5 refers to asset income of head and wife, and column
6 refers to adjusted family income (the adjustment consists on dividing family income by the square
root of family size). Specications also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI
and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and
include time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue
p < 0:1,  pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 6: Robustness to alternative denitions of income (quintiles)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tax inc.
(pre-tax)
tax inc.
(post-tax)
labour inc.
(pre-tax)
labour inc.
(post-tax)
asset inc.
(pre-tax)
fam. inc.
(pre-tax)
t -0.722
 -0.628 -1.027 -0.876 -0.115 -0.288
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
age (H) -0.739 -0.675 -0.379 -0.534 -0.498 1.092
(0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
age (W) 0.358 0.311 -0.057 0.080 0.315 -0.017
(0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23)
family size -0.520 -0.856 -1.007 -0.274 3.798 0.107
(0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.61) (0.55)
num children -0.640 -0.072 -0.260 -0.983 -5.079 -0.761
(0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.61) (0.56)
working wife 0.762 0.948 2.991 2.589 -1.385 -0.228
(0.95) (0.95) (0.94) (0.95) (0.95) (0.87)
health status -0.476 -0.840 0.317 -0.459 1.796 -0.064
(1.22) (1.22) (1.22) (1.22) (1.24) (1.15)
1st stage F-stat 1577 1577 1577 1577 1577 1577
N 50745 50745 50745 50745 50745 50745
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to a dierent
quintile of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal tax rate  . Specications
dier in how income is dened: columns 1-2 refer to taxable income of head and wife, columns 3-4
refer to labour income of head and wife, column 5 refers to asset income of head and wife, and column
6 refers to adjusted family income (the adjustment consists on dividing family income by the square
root of family size). Specications also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI
and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and
include time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue
p < 0:1,  pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 7: Robustness to further controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
t -0.828
 -0.789 -0.795 -0.695 -0.648 -0.655
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
age (H) -0.461 -0.436 4.533 -0.444 -0.403 4.512
(0.28) (0.28) (1.89) (0.26) (0.27) (1.85)
age (W) 0.114 0.178 -0.099 -0.022 0.002 -0.320
(0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27)
family size 0.018 -0.314 -0.578 -0.305 -0.543 -0.819
(0.64) (0.64) (0.68) (0.60) (0.60) (0.63)
num children -0.530 -0.473 -0.115 -0.365 -0.435 -0.207
(0.64) (0.65) (0.69) (0.61) (0.61) (0.64)
working wife 1.964 2.315 1.633 1.612 1.506 1.131
(0.99) (0.99) (1.02) (0.93) (0.94) (0.96)
health status 0.290 1.232 0.468 0.116 0.660 -0.071
(1.29) (1.29) (1.36) (1.24) (1.25) (1.31)
wealth -0.045 -0.051 -0.044
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
decilet 1 = 2 13.310 13.321 13.297
(1.39) (1.38) (1.40)
decilet 1 = 3 18.715 18.945 17.955
(1.42) (1.42) (1.45)
decilet 1 = 4 22.120 22.462 22.363
(1.38) (1.38) (1.42)
decilet 1 = 5 22.615 23.142 23.509
(1.35) (1.36) (1.40)
decilet 1 = 6 21.808 22.334 20.967
(1.34) (1.34) (1.38)
decilet 1 = 7 20.199 20.797 22.558
(1.35) (1.34) (1.38)
decilet 1 = 8 17.285 17.825 18.513
(1.39) (1.38) (1.43)
decilet 1 = 9 11.684 11.852 12.171
(1.40) (1.39) (1.44)
1st stage F-stat 1570 1570 1597 1567 1567 1596
N 47508 47508 44547 50745 50745 47791
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to a dierent
decile of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal tax rate t. Specications
also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers
AGI). Variable wealth is measured in thousands of 196 dollars. decilet 1 = k is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the income decile in the previous period was k. Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions
use panel data and include time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in
brackets.  pvalue p < 0:1,  pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
Table 8: Robustness to income controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
t -0.800
 -0.762 -0.771 -1.053 -1.009 -0.983
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
age (H) -0.714 -0.615 4.466 -0.437 -0.397 3.568
(0.28) (0.28) (1.88) (0.25) (0.25) (1.75)
age (W) 0.089 0.110 -0.195 0.039 0.065 -0.208
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26)
family size -0.253 -0.464 -0.712 0.046 -0.184 -0.441
(0.60) (0.61) (0.63) (0.57) (0.58) (0.62)
num children -0.402 -0.481 -0.255 -0.413 -0.486 -0.274
(0.61) (0.62) (0.65) (0.58) (0.59) (0.63)
working wife 1.771 1.753 1.500 2.940 2.855 2.410
(0.90) (0.90) (0.93) (0.91) (0.91) (0.94)
health status 0.321 0.834 0.048 -1.114 -0.573 -1.079
(1.24) (1.25) (1.32) (1.18) (1.19) (1.27)
log incomet 1 1.649 0.906 0.552
(1.66) (1.68) (1.69)
abs (incomet) 94.612
 94.837 87.523
(2.22) (2.22) (2.00)
1st stage F-stat 1791 1791 1802 1581 1581 1605
N 50741 50741 47788 50736 50736 47783
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to a dierent
decile of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal tax rate t. Specications
also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers
AGI). Additional controls account for lagged income and absolute income changes, where income is
measured as household's AGI. Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include
time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue p < 0:1,
 pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 9: IV Estimation with State and Payroll Tax rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
post-trans
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
post-trans
t -0.565
 -0.451 -0.334 -0.379 -0.356 -0.335
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19)
t 1.820 5.246 1.777 0.519 3.168 1.137
(4.19) (5.03) (4.28) (3.87) (4.32) (3.96)
age (H) 0.079 -0.323 -0.313 -0.521 -0.097 -0.240
(0.43) (0.49) (0.44) (0.41) (0.45) (0.41)
age (W) -0.678 -0.317 -0.101 0.263 -0.324 0.018
(0.42) (0.48) (0.43) (0.40) (0.45) (0.40)
family size -1.385 -1.997 -2.023 -0.726 -1.341 -0.940
(1.34) (1.53) (1.35) (1.25) (1.36) (1.27)
num children 2.093 5.196 2.366 0.563 3.253 1.261
(5.06) (6.03) (5.15) (4.69) (5.20) (4.77)
working wife -3.635 -11.042 -4.178 -1.522 -8.103 -3.984
(10.10) (11.99) (10.29) (9.37) (10.37) (9.57)
health status 2.007 3.240 2.657 -1.541 1.737 -0.342
(2.56) (2.91) (2.58) (2.41) (2.61) (2.45)
1st stage F-stat 1416 1416 1412 1416 1416 1412
N 35408 35408 35374 35408 35408 35374
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to a dierent
decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Taxes include federal income, payroll and state liabilities. Tax
reforms are used as instruments for the marginal tax rate t and the average tax rate t. Specications
also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI and post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers
AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and individual xed
eects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue p < 0:1,  pvalue p < 0:05,   
pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 10: IV Estimation Sample Stability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pre 1986
pre-tax
pre 1986
post-tax
pre 1986
post-trans
post 1986
pre-tax
post 1986
post-tax
post 1986
post-trans
t -0.835
 -0.971 -0.847 -1.018 -0.837 -0.690
(0.41) (0.37) (0.35) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26)
t -5.145
 -2.908 -1.476 -0.959 -0.068 -0.867
(1.76) (1.64) (1.53) (1.91) (1.92) (1.91)
age (H) 1.229 0.628 0.003 0.322 -1.073 -0.858
(0.69) (0.64) (2.08) (0.90) (0.94) (0.95)
age (W) -0.164 -0.005 -0.182 -0.745 0.760 0.837
(0.43) (0.42) (0.45) (0.89) (0.92) (0.94)
family size -0.802 -0.340 -0.740 -1.094 -1.274 -1.062
(0.81) (0.80) (0.85) (1.37) (1.38) (1.35)
num children -5.072 -3.300 -1.710 -0.147 0.222 -0.342
(1.86) (1.73) (1.58) (2.40) (2.41) (2.38)
working wife 9.666 5.382 3.978 3.410 1.902 0.441
(3.11) (2.84) (2.59) (4.62) (4.66) (4.64)
health status -2.792 -0.544 -2.121 -1.544 1.754 1.853
(1.97) (1.91) (1.98) (2.41) (2.34) (2.41)
1st st. F-stat 157 157 158 813 813 810
N 29069 29069 26144 19356 19356 19321
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal and average tax rates on the probability of moving
to a dierent decile of income before and after (including) 1986. Tax reforms are used as instruments
for the marginal tax rate t and the average tax rate t. Specications also dier on how income is
measured (pre-tax AGI and post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-
1996. All regressions use panel data and include time and individual xed eects. Robust standard
errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue p < 0:1,  pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 12: IV Estimation Jumps with ATR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
jump (D)
pre-tax
jump (D)
post-tax
jump (D)
post-trans
jump (Q)
pre-tax
jump (Q)
post-tax
jump (Q)
post-trans
t -0.013
 -0.012 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
t -0.112 -0.126 -0.002 -0.045 -0.062 -0.029
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
age (H) -0.000 0.002 0.067 -0.005 -0.000 0.042
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
age (W) 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
family size 0.016 0.014 -0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
num children -0.139 -0.148 -0.022 -0.055 -0.067 -0.032
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
working wife 0.174 0.202 -0.060 0.068 0.106 0.024
(0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
health status -0.042 -0.041 -0.016 -0.037 -0.025 -0.047
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
1st stage F-stat 944 944 948 944 944 948
N 50745 50745 47742 50745 50745 47742
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the number of income ranks (in
deciles, D, or quintiles, Q) crossed along the income distribution. Tax reforms are used as instruments
for the marginal tax rate t and the average tax rate t. Specications also dier on how income is
measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996.
All regressions use panel data and include time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors
are reported in brackets.  pvalue p < 0:1,  pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 13: Robustness to dierent lags of the marginal tax rate (deciles of income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
move (D)
pre-tax
move (D)
post-tax
t 1 -0.569 -0.414
(0.24) (0.24)
t 2 0.231 0.484
(0.27) (0.27)
t 3 -0.280 -0.264
(0.30) (0.30)
age (H) -0.633 -0.652 -0.175 0.510 2.814 0.105
(0.29) (0.29) (2.17) (2.17) (2.29) (2.29)
age (W) 0.229 0.177 0.613 0.271 0.096 0.255
(0.28) (0.28) (0.34) (0.34) (0.40) (0.40)
family size -0.657 -0.804 -0.444 -0.435 -0.876 -0.963
(0.61) (0.61) (0.65) (0.65) (0.69) (0.69)
num children 0.128 -0.066 0.355 0.061 0.211 -0.132
(0.62) (0.62) (0.67) (0.67) (0.71) (0.71)
working wife 0.900 -0.082 0.435 0.039 0.781 0.961
(0.84) (0.84) (0.89) (0.89) (0.96) (0.96)
health status 1.236 0.613 2.123 2.292 1.619 2.295
(1.27) (1.29) (1.40) (1.43) (1.52) (1.54)
1st stage F-stat 1583 1583 1395 1395 1180 1180
N 48507 48507 41118 41118 35449 35449
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to a
dierent decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal
tax rate t. Specications also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and
post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include
time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue p < 0:1,
 pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 14: Robustness to dierent lags of the marginal tax rate (quintiles of income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
move (Q)
pre-tax
move (Q)
post-tax
t 1 -0.790 -0.529
(0.23) (0.24)
t 2 0.129 0.153
(0.26) (0.26)
t 3 -0.270 -0.321
(0.28) (0.28)
age (H) -0.744 -0.594 1.484 1.687 2.203 0.395
(0.29) (0.29) (2.03) (2.02) (2.18) (2.16)
age (W) 0.574 0.318 0.889 0.682 0.249 0.450
(0.27) (0.28) (0.33) (0.32) (0.37) (0.37)
family size 0.149 -0.720 0.607 -0.130 0.144 -0.103
(0.59) (0.58) (0.62) (0.62) (0.66) (0.66)
num children -0.956 -0.173 -0.508 -0.491 -0.462 -0.738
(0.60) (0.59) (0.63) (0.63) (0.67) (0.67)
working wife -0.297 -0.296 -1.639 -1.022 -1.705 -1.194
(0.83) (0.83) (0.87) (0.87) (0.94) (0.94)
health status -1.328 -1.387 -0.668 -0.971 0.535 0.722
(1.25) (1.25) (1.37) (1.36) (1.47) (1.47)
1st stage F-stat 1583 1583 1395 1395 1180 1180
N 48507 48507 41118 41118 35449 35449
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving to a
dierent decile (D) or quintile (Q) of income. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for the marginal
tax rate t. Specications also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax AGI and
post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and include
time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue p < 0:1,
 pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 15: IV estimates: households without college educations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
up
pre-tax
up
post-tax
stay
pre-tax
stay
post-tax
down
pre-tax
down
post-tax
t -1.435
 -1.468 0.915 0.728 0.916 1.132
(0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.39) (0.39)
age (H) -0.162 0.059 0.492 0.315 -0.164 -0.231
(0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.34)
age (W) -0.300 -0.426 -0.114 -0.017 0.325 0.380
(0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32)
family size -0.824 -1.254 0.187 0.369 0.302 0.665
(0.69) (0.70) (0.67) (0.68) (0.77) (0.78)
num children 0.992 1.616 -0.225 -0.432 -0.498 -1.032
(0.72) (0.73) (0.70) (0.71) (0.80) (0.81)
working wife 16.792 16.364 -2.830 -2.099 -18.930 -19.024
(1.09) (1.09) (1.10) (1.10) (1.44) (1.44)
health status -0.002 -0.523 -0.292 -0.942 1.082 2.748
(1.47) (1.48) (1.39) (1.39) (1.66) (1.68)
1st stage F-stat 1181 1181 1181 1181 781 781
N 38417 38417 39766 39766 32229 32229
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving up to
a higher income decile (columns 1 and 2), staying in the same decile (columns 3 and 4) or moving
down to a lower decile (columns 5 and 6). Sample is restricted to observations where the head of the
household has not completed college education. Households with income in time t 1 belonging to the
10th decile are excluded from specications 1 and 2. Households with income in time t  1 belonging
to the 1st decile are excluded from specications 5 and 6. Tax reforms are used as an instrument for
the marginal tax rate t. Specications also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax
AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and
include time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue
p < 0:1,  pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 16: IV estimates: households with college education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
up
pre-tax
up
post-tax
stay
pre-tax
stay
post-tax
down
pre-tax
down
post-tax
t 0.438 0.071 0.480 1.061
 -0.994 -1.302
(0.54) (0.56) (0.51) (0.51) (0.49) (0.49)
age (H) -0.084 -0.654 0.352 0.503 0.190 0.320
(0.77) (0.77) (0.55) (0.52) (0.48) (0.50)
age (W) -0.526 -0.029 0.308 0.029 0.029 0.007
(0.74) (0.74) (0.52) (0.49) (0.46) (0.48)
family size 1.377 0.793 0.038 0.340 -0.155 0.385
(1.75) (1.73) (1.39) (1.39) (1.20) (1.22)
num children 0.006 0.220 1.443 2.180 -1.849 -2.948
(1.72) (1.71) (1.36) (1.36) (1.17) (1.19)
working wife 12.092 13.099 1.844 -0.323 -9.713 -8.397
(2.11) (2.15) (2.01) (2.03) (1.86) (1.88)
health status -1.956 -1.830 1.129 0.395 -1.252 -0.691
(3.43) (3.46) (3.02) (3.01) (2.84) (2.74)
1st stage F-stat 387 387 426 426 441 441
N 8259 8259 10556 10556 10316 10316
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving up to
a higher income decile (columns 1 and 2), staying in the same decile (columns 3 and 4) or moving
down to a lower decile (columns 5 and 6). Sample is restricted to observations where the head of the
household has completed college education. Households with income in time t   1 belonging to the
10th decile are excluded from specications 1 and 2. Households with income in time t  1 belonging
to the 1st decile are excluded from specications 5 and 6.Tax reforms are used as an instrument for
the marginal tax rate t. Specications also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax
AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and
include time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue
p < 0:1,  pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Table 17: IV estimates: households in bottom and top deciles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
up
pre-tax
up
post-tax
up
post-trans
down
pre-tax
down
post-tax
down
post-trans
t -1.564
 -1.719 -1.441 -0.620 -0.713 -0.644
(0.23) (0.25) (0.26) (0.94) (0.91) (0.91)
age (H) 1.237 1.218 2.850 0.303 0.764 2.790
(0.81) (0.77) (4.51) (0.63) (0.66) (5.09)
age (W) -0.303 -0.269 0.004 -0.103 -0.364 0.133
(0.80) (0.76) (0.78) (0.63) (0.64) (0.60)
family size 0.238 -0.831 -0.201 -2.026 -0.997 -0.058
(1.54) (1.55) (1.77) (1.52) (1.61) (1.63)
num children 2.588 4.343 4.509 -0.742 -2.839 -4.887
(1.60) (1.65) (1.95) (1.62) (1.69) (1.78)
working wife 22.714 22.091 20.406 -16.340 -17.331 -17.583
(1.90) (1.92) (2.02) (3.78) (3.65) (3.96)
health status -1.449 -0.469 1.695 8.676 10.286 7.548
(2.89) (3.01) (3.26) (3.91) (4.46) (4.58)
1st stage F-stat 456 439 438 90 91 73
N 6961 6830 6313 3330 3379 3170
Note: IV (2SLS) estimates of the eects of marginal tax rates on the probability of moving up to a
higher income decile for households in the bottom decile (columns 1-3) or the probability of moving to
a lower decile for households in the top decile (columns 4-6). Tax reforms are used as an instrument for
the marginal tax rate t. Specications also dier on how income is measured (pre-tax AGI, post-tax
AGI and post-tax and post-transfers AGI). Time span is 1967-1996. All regressions use panel data and
include time and individual xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  pvalue
p < 0:1,  pvalue p < 0:05,    pvalue p < 0:01.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Evolution of the probability of transition matrix (1967-1996)
PANEL A: Bottom decile
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PANEL B: Top decile
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Note: Evolution of indices of mobility at the bottom and top deciles between 1967-1968. Panel A
shows the evolution of the probability that a households leave the rst decile of income (i.e. 1 P 1;1 in
Equation 2). Panel B shows the evolution of the probability that a households moves down from the
top decile of income (i.e. 1  P 10;10 in Equation 2). The distribution is computed using both pre-tax
and post-tax income.
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Figure A2: Variation in Average Tax Rates (1967-1996)
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Note: Evolution of the average tax rates between 1967-1968.The gure displays the average ratio of
total federal income tax liabilities to adjusted gross income (AGI) for each income decile. Tax liabilities
are computed using TAXSIM and data from PSID.
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Figure A3: Variations in Average Tax Rates due to legislated tax changes (1967-1996)
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Note: Evolution between 1967 and 1996 of the instrument   t 1i;t = 
t
i;t   t 1i;t (dierence between the
actual average tax rate and a counterfactual average tax rate computed using TAXSIM). Grey bars
represent the narrative measure of legislated tax changes (as percentage of nominal GDP) from Romer
and Romer (2010). These are classied as endogenous tax changes (related to the current state of the
economy, in light grey) and exogenous tax changes (unrelated to the state of economy, in dark grey).
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Figure A4: Variation in total marginal tax rates (1977-1996)
Note: Relationship between total marginal tax rates and real Adjusted Gross Income (1996 US dollars).
Total marginal tax rates include the federal marginal rates on individual income, payroll and Social
Security liabilities and State marginal tax rates for each household and year in the PSID before and
after the 1986 tax reform (in red and blue, respectively).
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Table A1: Correlations between taxes (R&R, total) and mobility
Romer
move (P) pre-tax -0.192
move (P) post-tax -0.303
move (Q) pre-tax -0.199
move (Q) post-tax -0.263
trace (P) pre-tax -0.112
trace (P) post-tax -0.169
trace (Q) pre-tax -0.173
trace (Q) pre-tax -0.216
jump (pre-tax) -0.206
jump (post-tax) -0.225
Note: Correlation between indices of mobility and the narrative measure of total legislated tax changes
(as percentage of nominal GDP) from Romer and Romer (2010). Mobility indices are the percentage
of people changing income deciles (rows 1-2) or quintiles (rows 3-4), the normalised trace index (NTI,
rows 5-6 for deciles and 7-8 for quintiles) and the average number of income deciles passed by a
household between two adjacent years. The mobility indices are computed using both income before
taxes (pre-tax) and after taxes (post-tax).
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